Motivated by the Green and Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) 
Introduction
Firms' coordination to obtain high profits has been a continuous concern for researchers and antitrust authorities. As a consequence, there exists a large body of theoretical work on the factors that determine the likelihood of collusion. But empirical analyses of collusion are difficult because the illegal status of cartels makes data scarcely available. Further, even if such data were available, the task of identifying and estimating the effect of different market conditions on collusion can be difficult due to many unobservable factors in field data. This article seeks to improve the understanding of the role of two factors that have been prominent in models of repeated interaction with stochastic demand: demand information (knowledge of next period's demand realization) 1 and monitoring (knowledge of rivals' past actions). More specifically, we analyze the effects of these factors on collusion by generating data from controlled experiments ROJAS / 79 that have varying degrees of uncertainty along these two market conditions. In addition, we use the generated data to analyze whether some well-known theoretical predictions find support in the data.
The motivation for our inquiry comes from two influential models in the literature, Green and Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) (GP and RS henceforth) . Both models assume a stochastic demand structure, but differ in their assumptions regarding what firms know about next period's demand and rivals' actions. First, RS assume that firms have perfect foresight about demand next period, whereas GP assume that firms are always uncertain about demand realizations (past and future). Second, GP assume that monitoring among cartel members is imperfect, in the form of a noisy public signal, whereas RS assume that monitoring is perfect. Our experimental design is guided by these differences in assumptions: in two of our treatments, monitoring and demand information differ in the same way as GP and RS differ. In a third, intermediate, treatment there is uncertainty about next period's demand realization (as in GP) but monitoring is perfect (as in RS); this treatment allows us to separate the imperfect monitoring effect from the imperfect demand information effect.
The differences in assumptions of the RS and GP models can generate different collusive equilibria. GP show that there can be a collusive equilibrium where price wars (possibly temporary ones) are part of the equilibrium path; the model predicts that such reversionary periods are triggered by unusually low demand realizations. Conversely, RS show that a cartel may experience price wars during periods of unusually large demand shocks. Thus, a common interpretation of these theories is that GP predicts more collusion during booms, whereas RS predicts more collusion during, or as a consequence of, recessions.
2
Our article has two main objectives. First, we investigate whether and how collusion is affected by whether demand information and monitoring.
3 Second, we study whether predictions of the RS and GP models find support in their respective treatments. In particular, we study whether collusion in the RS environment is inversely related to the level of demand to be faced next period, and whether a low demand realization in the previous period triggers less collusive behavior in later periods in the GP environment. 4 Results indicate that for a sufficiently high discount rate, demand information seems to facilitate collusion more than monitoring, especially as subjects gain experience. This effect can range from being statistically insignificant to increasing the probability of collusion by 0.33. The effect of monitoring, on the other hand, is of smaller magnitude and less precise: it ranges from being statistically insignificant to increasing the probability of collusion by 0.15.
Although predictions of both the RS and GP models find some support in the data, a robust finding is that subjects' behavior in the RS treatment conforms closely to the countercyclical collusive prediction of the Rotemberg and Saloner theory. Relative to periods in which anticipated demand is low or medium, the probability of collusion in anticipation of a high demand period is lower by as much as 0.69 and 0.53, respectively. Remarkably, results indicate that a high demand realization does not collapse collusion entirely, as subjects are able to return to high levels of cooperation afterward.
From an industrial organization point of view, studying collusion in uncertain environments is important because no real-world market operates under complete certainty. There have been empirical efforts to study collusion under uncertainty in particular industry settings. Studies of this type that have a connection to this article have primarily tested the predictions of the RS and GP models (jointly or individually). These papers include Porter (1983) , Ellison (1994) , Borenstein and Shepard (1996) , and Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003) . In some cases the studies have found evidence in favor of the theory being evaluated, whereas in other cases there has been little or no support.
In contrast with the cited literature, our investigation exploits the control provided by the lab to ensure that the studied market environment satisfies the assumptions of the model of interest. This approach can be informative for two reasons. First, the large number of equilibria that are mathematically possible in infinitely repeated games has led some economists to criticize the usefulness of the theory. Second, there is relatively little evidence as to which market conditions make a particular collusive equilibrium more likely to emerge. Our experiments not only suggest that tacit collusion is more likely to arise in certain stochastic environments but that it can be fairly elaborate (as in our RS treatment).
We are not the first to study collusion under uncertainty in the lab, however. 5 Several studies have introduced the notion of "noise" to the repeated prisoner's dilemma in several ways. The basic feature of the main treatments in these studies is that although subjects face a "baseline" payoff matrix prior to choosing their strategy, the realized payoffs become "noisy" after the game is played. Specifically, a stochastic rule can change either the baseline payoffs or the strategy of each player. The studies by Feinberg and Snyder (2002) , Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006) , and Aoyagi and Frechette (2008) fall into the first category, whereas the studies by Holcomb and Nelson (1997) and Fudenberg, Rand, and Dreber (forthcoming) fall into the latter. Except for the study by Bereby-Meyer and Roth, a common feature among these papers is that subjects cannot know with certainty their opponent's choice; this feature makes these designs most similar to our GP treatment. Conversely, Bereby-Meyer and Roth allow for perfect monitoring after decisions have been made, making this design somewhat comparable to our intermediate treatment. The consensus in this literature is that noise plays an important role: relative to treatments where noise is absent or less important, collusion is lower (or slower to evolve).
6
Our article differs from this experimental literature in two ways. First, we are interested in collusion in markets characterized by uncertainty rather than on "context-free" cooperation in the presence of some abstract notion of noise. In contrast, we frame our experiment as a game in which subjects act as sellers in a (hypothetical) market where noise takes the form of uncertain future demand.
7 Second, one aim of prior work has been to compare uncertain environments with deterministic counterparts. Although informative, a deterministic benchmark might be less useful from a practical point of view. Instead, we preserve the stochastic nature of future demand and manipulate two market conditions within this uncertain baseline.
There is an industrial organization strand of the experimental literature that is related (in motivation and design) to our interest in the RS model, although in versions somewhat different from the original theory. Ruffle (2009) investigates whether large buyers pay lower prices when facing oligopolistic sellers in a market where buyers of different sizes appear randomly for an infinite numbers of periods. Consistent with RS's predictions and our results, the author finds overall support for countercyclical pricing: lower prices are offered to high demand buyers. Abbink and Brandts (2009) study finitely repeated duopolies with a deterministic demand pattern 5 There have been several papers looking at the feasibility of cooperation in the two-player prisoner's dilemma under no uncertainty. These lab investigations include Dal Bó (2005), Duffy and Ochs (2009), and Dal Bó and Frechette (2011) . A common finding in this work is that collusion, when it is a feasible equilibrium, is more likely to occur when the discount factor is higher and when subjects gain more experience.
6 These studies differ in several dimensions. Monitoring is public in the Aoyagi and Frechette design but is private in the other studies. In addition to studying the effect of noise, the studies of Aoyagi and Frechette and Fudenberg et al. present a thorough analysis of subjects' strategies. The last two studies provide useful accounts of this literature. 7 We could not verify whether the Feinberg and Snyder (2002) experiment used neutral language because instructions for this study were not available.
C RAND 2012. in which future demand either shrinks or grows. Although the authors find evidence that is at odds with RS predictions, it remains unclear whether this is attributable to a design that does not match the stochastic and infinitely repeated nature of the RS theory. The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 provides details of the experimental design and Section 4 describes its implementation. Finally, Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 briefly discusses our main findings.
The model
Our experience, as well as prior experimental work (see Holt, 1995) , suggests that games with a limited set of strategies and players give collusion a higher chance of occurrence. Therefore, we employ a prisoner's dilemma version of the model, specifically a two-firm Cournot game with symmetric firms and two quantity choices (low (L) and high (H)).
8 Further, we assume three demand states: high (h), medium (m), and low (l). The game is infinitely repeated and the demand states occur with probabilities 0.60 for medium and 0.20 for both high and low. The payoff table for demand state s ∈ (l, m, h) has the structure shown in Table 1 . With one demand state, and if firms use a grim-trigger strategy, it is well known that the collusive outcome (L, L) can be supported in equilibrium if
where δ is the discount factor. Thus, collusion will be sustainable if firms' discount factor is larger than the critical value δ
With stochastic demand, collusive equilibrium paths with temporary reversions to the competitive outcome are possible. We turn to these theories in our setup.
The RS model: perfect demand foresight and perfect monitoring. In addition to perfect monitoring of rivals' actions, RS assume that firms know with certainty the demand realization in the next period, but that firms only know the distribution of demand realizations for the remaining future periods. 9 In this setting, the future punishment of deviation is independent of next period's demand realization, whereas the incentive to deviate is only a function of next period's demand realization. RS show that for a sufficiently high demand realization next period, the incentive to deviate is greater than the future punishment and thus collusion can no longer be supported as an equilibrium. In the literature, this breakdown is interpreted as either countercyclical pricing or as price wars during booms. RS indicate that the model can yield either result, depending on the strategy space. If the strategy space is continuous, smooth countercyclical pricing will be observed in equilibrium. Conversely, if the strategy space is constrained to either compete or collude (as is the case here), then price wars (or reversion to Cournot) will be observed during periods of sufficiently high demand (RS). The corresponding RS version of (1) is thus
where E(·) represents the expected punishment over the different demand states. To accommodate the main prediction of the RS theory, we construct payoff tables so that equation (2) can, in some cases, hold for the medium (m) and low (l) demand states but not for the high (h) demand state; that is, [
As is the case with infinitely repeated games, the RS prediction is one of several equilibria. In Appendix A.1 as well as later in the paper, we show when the RS prediction (and other outcomes) can be feasible equilibria in our experimental design.
The GP model: no demand foresight and imperfect monitoring. GP assume that in any period t, firms know only the distribution of demand realizations next period. In addition, firms can only imperfectly monitor their rivals' quantity choices through a noisy signal, that is, the market price. These two sources of uncertainty prevent firms from inferring their opponent's action even after the realization of demand. GP show that there can be a collusive equilibrium where finite price wars are part of the collusive path. A crucial feature of the model is that price wars are triggered by a low demand realization (revealed to firms in the form of a low market price) rather than by firms' deviation; the intuition for this result is that if any suspicious behavior is not castigated, the threat of punishment is not credible.
More formally, GP assume that firms use a trigger strategy in which all players revert to the Nash equilibrium (H, H) for N periods when the noisy signal (price) falls below threshold level k. The GP model involves a nontrivial optimization problem in which the length of the optimal punishment, the trigger price, and the level of collusion have to be adjusted. These calculations, however, are straightforward in our experimental design.
Denote firm i's choice as y i ∈ {L, H }. Also, define f ( p|y) as the density function that determines the probability of observing price level p given the outcome y = (y i , y j ), and F( p|y) is its corresponding cumulative distribution function. The expected payoff in each reversionary period is given by λ i = 0.2
l , and the expected profit (for nextperiod) when the opponent is sticking to the collusive quantity (L) is
Last, define V i recursively as
where
That is, for a given (price) threshold level k, firm i's output choice can shift the probability with which the observed price level may fall below k (given that the other firm sticks to the collusive outcome). After some manipulation, (3a) can be written as
The resulting Bellman equation that ensures the existence of the GP equilibrium, for a given punishment length N and a threshold price k, is given by
There could be many values of N for which this condition holds (or none at all), including N = ∞. Similarly, there can be several threshold prices for which one can find a finite N such that (4) holds. Computation of all feasible equilibria for our experimental setup, including all feasible punishment lengths and threshold prices, can be found in Appendix A.
Experimental design
To simulate an infinitely repeated game with discount factor δ, a subject interacts with another seller with a continuation probability equal to δ (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1989) . After a repeated game (a "supergame") is terminated, subjects are rematched with another seller; this exercise continues until the allotted time for the session is over. This design is attractive for two reasons. First, it generates numerous infinitely repeated games. Second, it produces a few lengthy supergames where certain behavior (i.e., temporary reversals to competition, as in GP) is more likely to arise. We implement our baseline experiments with δ = 0.75 and study additional experiments with δ = 0.60 and δ = 0.90.
The experiment is framed as a duopoly market in which participants act as sellers of a hypothetical good who decide between two output levels in each period. In each period, subjects are asked to simultaneously choose a quantity (high (H) or low (L)). Profits are determined by one of three tables: high demand (h), medium demand (m), or low demand (l). This is illustrated in Table 2 .
Every period, each table is chosen with the probabilities indicated earlier (0.2, 0.6, and 0.2, respectively); probabilities are known by all subjects in all treatments. There are two sets of payoff matrices. The main difference between these two parameterizations is that deviation is less attractive in parameterization 2: the additional profits from deviation are smaller, and reversion to NE play is more costly. Using different parameterizations and discount factors allows us to investigate the robustness of the results to different collusive incentives.
We construct three treatments by varying the way in which demand information is presented to subjects. To keep treatments comparable, subjects in all treatments remain uninformed about their opponent's choice; this means that when monitoring is allowed, the opponent's choice can be inferred from the payoff tables.
(i) Full information treatment (FI) (RS theory). Before a period starts, subjects are told which demand state they will face. Hence, uncertainty about next period's demand state is removed, although demand states for future periods remain unknown. Similarly, monitoring is feasible because in our design it is possible to infer the rival's strategy after a period's profit is realized. (ii) Imperfect monitoring treatment (IM) (GP theory). Subjects only know the distribution for next period's demand state: demand next period will most likely be "normal" (i.e., medium with probability 0.60), but there is also a chance of experiencing a demand shock (high or low, each with probability 0.20); further, our experimental software does not inform subjects of the demand state during the previous period. Note that with the constructed payoff tables, this setup allows for imperfect monitoring of the opponent's choice of output even after profits have been realized for that period. To see this, suppose that player 1 chooses to collude (L) and his profit turns out to be 2.10 (parameterization 1). If demand was low, it means that the opponent also chose the collusive outcome (L), but if demand was medium it means that the opponent deviated from it (H). This imperfect monitoring is possible whether a firm chooses the high or the low output. 10 As assumed by GP, our design implies that imperfect monitoring is public. To see this, note that because subjects know their own profit as well as the chosen quantity, they can also (indirectly) perceive the corresponding price: this price is the noisy public signal as defined by GP (Appendix B illustrates this point in greater detail). 11, 12 (iii) Monitoring treatment (M) (intermediate treatment). Here, imperfect monitoring is removed from the IM treatment by informing subjects of the chosen demand state right after a period is over; this is equivalent to informing them of their opponent's choice. 13 This treatment isolates one of the two factors that differentiate the FI treatment from the IM treatment. In the M treatment, collusion can be an equilibrium if the following condition (a modified version of (1)) is met 14 :
10 A system of equations allows us to maintain the imperfect monitoring structure (available upon request). 11 Alternatively, subjects could be informed of the noisy price. A possible downside of this approach is that instructions increase in complexity and subjects are not informed of earnings until the end of the experiment (see Aoyagi and Frechette, 2008 for an example of such a procedure). 12 In the analysis below, we focus on the threshold given by the price corresponding to the collusive profit in the low demand state, c l . Appendix A provides an explanation for this choice. 13 A "perfect demand foresight" with "imperfect monitoring" treatment is unfeasible, as this case would allow subjects to infer their opponent's strategy.
14 Although we do not have a strong theoretical prediction about whether collusion would be easier (or more difficult) in the M treatment with respect to the FI treatment, it is likely that the M treatment is a more collusive-friendly environment because this treatment is equivalent to the case of deterministic demand (at least when firms are risk neutral) and, by the logic of RS, we know that collusion is more difficult when demand fluctuates.
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Note: δ is the discount factor (continuation probability); FI = full information treatment, M = monitoring treatment, IM = imperfect monitoring treatment; P1 = parameterization 1, P2 = parameterization 2. The collusive equilibria considered in the FI and M treatments are based on a grim-trigger strategy. Appendix A discusses additional feasible equilibria in both FI and IM treatments r is the coefficient of relative risk aversion from the CRRA utility specification; r < 0 denotes risk-loving behavior, r = 0 is risk neutrality, and r > 0 is risk aversion.
a Collusion is feasible during medium and low demand states but not during the high demand state. b N represents the length of a price war for which the GP equilibrium exists; if a GP equilibrium for N exists, then a GP equilibrium for N + i (i = 1, . . . .) also exists. The equilibrium considered here assumes that the threshold is the price that corresponds to the collusive profit in the low demand state ( One important feature of the experimental design is that the payoff matrices are constructed so that the percentage difference between payoffs and across entries remains invariant across demand states. For example, in parameterization 1, the payoff in the collusive outcome is about 100% higher (with rounding error) than the payoff in the Nash equilibrium. The reason for constructing payoff matrices in this fashion is that individuals seem to care about relative variation in payoffs rather than the absolute variation (Weber, Shafir, and Blais, 2004) . Thus, potential confounding effects of variation in relative payoffs across demand states are reduced.
In sum, the experiment considers three treatments and four δ-parameterization pairs (δ−P): δ = 0.60−P1, δ = 0.75−P1, δ = 0.75−P2, δ = 0.90 − P2. Because different δ−P pairs offer different incentives for collusion, it is important to discuss the feasibility of collusive equilibria in our design. In the FI treatment, we consider two possible collusive equilibria, the equilibrium devised by RS (collusion in medium and low demand states but not in high demand states) as well as the "fully" collusive equilibrium (collusion in all demand states). For the M treatment we consider collusion in every period, whereas for the IM treatment we consider the GP equilibrium (temporary price wars triggered by a low demand state).
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Theories of infinitely repeated games assume risk neutrality by subjects; thus, one possibility is to report the feasibility of each collusive equilibrium under this assumption. However, the experimental economics literature has documented varying degrees of risk tolerance by subjects in the lab, with risk aversion being the most common finding (Harrison and Ruström, 2008) . We adopt the convention in the literature of assuming a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function and compute the range of the risk aversion parameter (r) for which each collusive equilibrium is feasible.
16 Table 3 reports this range for each cell in our experimental design. As stated earlier, the experiments with discount factor δ = 0.75 can be considered as our baseline (because δ = 0.75 is used in both parameterizations). The other two discount factors either expand or restrict the ranges of the CRRA coefficient over which collusive equilibria are feasible. As one moves from the first to the last δ−P pair in the table, the CRRA range becomes larger, indicating that the environment becomes more "collusive friendly." This is expected, as theory indicates that more patient firms (i.e., a larger discount factor) and smaller net gains from deviation (i.e., moving from parameterization 1 to parameterization 2) should result in stronger incentives to collude. 
Implementation
Twelve sessions with a total of 244 subjects were run. Six sessions (two per treatment) were run with each parameterization. Three sessions were run with parameterization 1 using δ = 0.60, three sessions were run with parameterization 2 using δ = 0.90, and the remaining six sessions (three with each parameterization) were run using the baseline discount factor, δ = 0.75. Subjects were recruited from a variety of courses at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst throughout the spring of 2010 and were informed that the experiment would last approximately two hours. Demographic composition was not unusual for laboratory experiments with college students: 35% were females, 66% were white, and the combined number of juniors and seniors was 63% (with the remaining 37% distributed relatively evenly among freshmen, sophomores, and graduate students). Subjects received a $7 show-up fee and earned additional money from their decisions; earnings from decisions were in experimental dollars ($1 = 30 experimental $). The number of participants and average earnings are presented in Table 4 .
All experiments were computerized and programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Web Appendix C contains instructions for one of the treatments. Students were assigned a computer terminal and advised that they would be randomly paired with multiple "other sellers" in the room for as long as time permitted and that communication with other participants was forbidden. The continuation probability (0.60, 0.75, or 0.90) was implemented from period 1 and subjects were informed that the matching mechanism was determined by a random number: if after a period the random number chosen by the computer was greater than δ, they would be rematched with another participant in the room; otherwise they would remain interacting with the current "other seller."
Special efforts were made to ensure subjects' comprehension and familiarity with the experiment before the start of the game. Extensive instructions were coupled with three practice periods, each with one demand state, and a quiz. If a subject did not respond correctly to a question in the quiz, the participant was approached by the experimenter for explanation. A variety of colors was used for the different demand states and to distinguish own profits from the other seller's profits. Also, the three possible profit tables were permanently displayed on the left-hand side of the screen (see Web Appendix C). All subjects in all treatments were informed about the probability of appearance of each profit table. To determine the demand state (high, medium, or low), random draws from a uniform distribution were taken once and the same set of demand states implied by these draws was used in all treatments to preserve comparability. Similarly, a predetermined set of draws was used to establish the length of supergames across all sessions. Table 5 summarizes the length of supergames for the three discount factors (the complete sequence of supergame lengths appears in Appendix D). Finally, all sessions ended at period 120 to make each of them last approximately two hours, including instructions.
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A period consisted of subjects making simultaneous decisions between low output (L) and high output (H); afterward, subjects were informed of profits and the period ended. In the FI treatment, the decision screen presented subjects with the demand state they would face. Conversely, in the IM and M treatments, the decision screen only reminded subjects of the probability with which each demand state would be chosen for play.
In the M treatment, the profit screen revealed the chosen demand state. Also, this screen highlighted the cell in the chosen profit table that determined the subject's profit. Because the FI and M treatments imply perfect monitoring after the period is over, the profit screen for both of these treatments was the same. In the IM treatment, the profit screen presented subjects with the possible outcomes that might have occurred, effectively implementing the desired imperfect monitoring. The figures in Appendix E display the screen shots of decision and profit screens for the three treatments.
The program also contains a history table where subjects can see their cumulative earnings. In addition to the experiment, subjects completed a small survey that contained questions on demographics, subjects' assessment of the clarity of the experiment, 19 and an open-ended question regarding the strategy used. We use these responses later in the analysis. A total of 29,280 observations were collected (120 periods × 244 participants). At the end of the experiment, subjects were individually called in private and were paid their cumulative earnings in cash.
Results
Our strategy for reporting results was to group findings into (i) the effect of information and monitoring on collusion and (ii) theoretical predictions of the RS and GP models supported by the 18 One potential concern with the use of a predetermined number of total rounds is that subjects could exchange this information outside the lab, thereby generating an undesirable end-of-game effect. As explained later (and in Appendix G), this effect seems unimportant in this experiment. 19 Answers to the statement "The instructions for the experiment were clear and easy to follow" were: strongly agree (70%), agree (23%), neither agree nor disagree (3%), disagree (2%), and strongly disagree (2%). data. The following section presents a descriptive analysis of the data, and the section after that presents the econometric analysis. In what follows, the analysis focuses, primarily, on a subject's decision to collude.
Descriptive results. In this section, we slice the data in subsets that are meaningful for the two objectives of the article. We report graphically, for each subset, the fraction of subjects who choose to collude. We then discuss the most salient patterns of the data. Figure 1 presents the fraction of times, across all 120 periods, that subjects chose the collusive outcome (y axis); this information is displayed for each of the 12 experimental sessions (x axis). The 12 sessions are sorted from left to right first by parameterization (P1, P2), then by discount factor (δ = 0.60, 0.75, 0.90), and then by treatment (FI, M, and then IM). Each line on the graph corresponds to a different δ-P pair, and it connects the frequencies of the three treatments in that pair.
Effect of demand information and monitoring on collusion and other patterns.
There are three aspects of the figure worth highlighting. First, collusion rates appear to increase as the theoretical incentives to collude become stronger: for a given treatment, the frequency of collusion (7 out of 9 cases) increases as one moves across δ-P pairs from left to right. Second, a drop in the frequency of collusion from the FI to the M treatment in all δ-P pairs suggests that lack of knowledge of next period's demand state hinders collusion. Further, the importance of this effect appears to increase as the environment becomes more collusive friendly. Third, the effect of monitoring appears to be mixed, with two δ-P pairs showing an increase in the frequency of collusion from the M to the IM treatment and the other two experiencing decreases (albeit larger in magnitude than the increases).
Learning and end-of-game effects often arise in repeated-interaction experiments. In our setting, we are primarily concerned with learning that expresses itself as growing collusion as time progresses. Conversely, an end-of-game effect is associated with a sharp decline in collusion late in the experiment as subjects "sense" the last period of play is approaching. We explore the existence of these effects by looking at the frequency of collusion in each supergame. 20 20 There are sufficient supergames toward the end of the experiment for this exercise to be a reliable check of the end-of-game effect. In the last 13 periods of the experiment there are, respectively, six, five, and three supergames in the three discount factor environments considered (δ = 0.60, 0.75, 0.90). The last supergame initiates in period 120 for C RAND 2012.
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FIGURE 2
FRACTION OF TIMES THAT SUBJECTS CHOSE THE COLLUSIVE OUTPUT, BY SUPERGAME
Note: The smooth lines correspond to the fit of a quadratic trend.
The four panels in Figure 2 report these frequencies, together with the fit given by a quadratic trend.
In terms of the overall evolution of collusion, the FI environment shows the steepest trend of all three treatments: it is clearly positive in all but the least collusive-friendly setting (δ = 0.60). Conversely, the M and IM treatments show trends that are either flat or slightly downward sloping, except in the δ = 0.75-P2 pair, where there appears to be an upward trend in both the M and IM treatments. We interpret these patterns as suggestive of stronger learning effects in the RS treatment. The figure suggests that an end-of-game effect is unlikely. 21 Finally, the data exhibit two other features, a "restart" effect and a "reciprocate" effect. The former refers to an increase in collusion when a new supergame starts (i.e., when subjects are rematched, with another seller), whereas the latter refers to a greater likelihood of collusion in the current period when the other seller decided to collude in the previous period. Figures F1 and  F2 illustrate these two effects.
Theory-related patterns. In this section, we investigate whether collusion frequencies are consistent in ways predicted by RS and GP theories. We first focus on how the frequency of collusion varies by type of demand under two conditions: (i) demand that is to be faced next period, and (ii) demand faced in the previous period. The reason for looking at collusion under these two conditions is that RS and GP provide distinct predictions in each situation. In RS, collusion is expected to decrease when firms anticipate a high demand state, but it should be δ = 0.60 and δ = 0.75 and in period 114 for δ = 0.90. Looking at the frequency of collusion by supergame (rather than by period) helps to better visualize the evolution of play.
21 This effect was formally tested in the next regressions similar to those presented in the next section. Appendix G displays the results. 
FRACTION OF TIMES THAT SUBJECTS CHOSE THE COLLUSIVE OUTPUT, BY LEVEL OF DEMAND TO BE FACED NEXT PERIOD (BY SESSION)
Note: See notes in Figure 1 and text for acronym details.
independent of the prior demand realization (i.e., collusion should return to "normal" levels after a high demand period). Conversely, next period's demand level should be unimportant in GP, whereas collusion should become less likely after a low demand realization. Figure 3 reports the frequency of collusion by the type of demand to be faced the next period. Unsurprisingly, in the two treatments that do not provide information on the demand realization (M and IM), next period's demand realization does not appear to have an impact on collusive behavior. Conversely, and consistent with RS's prediction, collusion in the FI treatment is significantly lower when subjects anticipate a high demand state, with the frequency of collusion being between 2.3 and 5.7 times smaller than the frequency of collusion when facing a low demand realization next period (these two numbers correspond, respectively, to the 0.90-P2 and 0.60-P1 pairs). Further, the figure shows that collusion in the FI treatment appears to be lower in the medium demand state relative to the high demand state, although this difference is much smaller in parameterization 2. This last observation suggests that the RS theory is a more accurate predictor of behavior in parameterization 2. This is consistent with the RS equilibrium being feasible for a wider range of risk attitudes in parameterization 2 than in parameterization 1 (see Table 3 ). Figure 4 reports the frequency of collusion by the type of demand faced in the previous period. It can be seen that a small difference in the frequency of collusion across the three demand realizations is more clearly present in the IM treatment, especially when high and low demand are contrasted. Although the existence of GP-style patterns in the data (i.e., finite price wars) is more difficult to visualize and capture descriptively, the observed drop in the frequency of collusion following a low demand period is consistent with the trigger mechanism suggested by GP.
Notably, the frequency of collusion in the FI treatment is slightly higher after a high demand state than after the other two demand realizations. In other words, the high levels of defection observed in anticipation of a high demand period (Figure 3) do not appear to trigger long-lasting price wars, which is in line with the countercyclical path of the RS model. This return to "normal" levels of collusion after a high demand realization can be observed in more detail in Figures F4  and F5 .
In GP, once a price war starts, its length is independent of the demand realizations during the punishment phase. Because some of the low demand realizations may well arise during a price war, a fairer exercise might be to compare frequencies between (i) all periods leading up to the first low demand realization in a supergame and (ii) the period following such realization. 
FRACTION OF TIMES THAT SUBJECTS CHOSE THE COLLUSIVE OUTPUT, BY LEVEL OF DEMAND FACED IN THE PREVIOUS PERIOD (BY SESSION)
Note: See notes in Figure 1 and text for acronym details. Figure F3 reports these results and confirms the moderate support for the type of trigger suggested by GP in the IM treatment.
Because many supergames in our design are too short for finite price wars to emerge (as predicted by GP), we visually inspected the collusive frequencies for longest supergame in the IM treatment (not shown). In line with the evidence reported earlier, collusive behavior appears to drop after a low demand realization, especially in parameterization 2. This occurs in five out of six cases when δ = 0.75 and in five out of seven cases when δ = 0.90, versus four out of six cases in parameterization 1 (δ = 0.75).
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Econometric model and results. A concern with experimental data is that observations within a session are unlikely to be independent of each other (Houser, 2008) . First, behavior might depend on past actions or experience (the so-called dynamic session effects, as discussed in Frechette, forthcoming). Further, individual-specific unobservables make each subject's decisions correlated across time. We rely on standard panel data techniques to address these issues and to carry out hypothesis tests of interest. Specifically, we model individual i's decision to cooperate in period t, and write it as
where y it denotes cooperation (1) or defection (0), 1 [·] is an indicator function, z it is a vector of explanatory variables,
) is an unobserved and random heterogeneity term, and e it is an idiosyncratic error term. We assume a nonzero mean for c i to deal with the initial-conditions problem (Wooldridge, 2002) and set ζ i equal to y i0 . 23 The vector of parameters γ as well as α, ψ and σ 2 c are estimated from the data. The vector z it contains indicator variables for the experimental controls of interest (treatment dummies), variables controlling for time aspects of the session (the overall round in the experiment and an indicator for the first round of a supergame), variables that account for experience (own and rival behavior in prior periods), 22 We did not analyze data from the δ = 0.60-P1 session as the longest supergame in this pair contains only eight rounds. 23 Here, y i0 refers to the choice in the first overall period in the experiment. Other specifications that set ζ i equal to the mean or the median of y it across all first rounds (in all supergames) produced similar results (available upon request). A similar specification is adopted by Aoyagi and Frechette (2008) . and indicators for prior and/or future demand conditions. Importantly, besides controlling for time-and history-dependent behavior, this specification accounts for correlation across decisions within the same individual through σ 2 c .
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Effect of demand information and monitoring on collusion. Table 6 displays results of probit regressions of (6) that test whether collusive intensity varies across the three treatments. The table contains three specifications for each of the four δ-parameterization combinations. The three specifications control for the evolution of collusion over time, but they differ in the flexibility with which such evolution is accommodated. Specification 1 allows for a linear trend (the variable "Period"), whereas specifications 2 and 3 allow this trend to vary by treatment. Specification 3 is more flexible, as it allows for a quadratic trend by treatment. Finally, all regressions include an indicator for whether the other seller colluded in the prior period as well as an indicator for the first round of a supergame.
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Before discussing the main results from the regressions, we note a few consistent findings across specifications. First, the strong statistical significance of ρ = σ 2 c /σ 2 c + 1 provides support for the random-effects specification. Second, the estimate of ψ indicates that an individual's propensity to collude at the start of the experiment (ζ i ) appears to be, in all but one case, an important determinant of collusion. Third, collusion is significantly more likely during the first round of a supergame as well as when the other seller colluded in the prior period.
Using specification 1 as a benchmark, it can be seen that although collusion appears to be higher (lower) in the FI (IM) treatment relative to the M treatment, the only statistically significant result is that of the FI treatment in the δ = 0.90-P2 pair. Also, in three out of the four δ-parameterization pairs, overall collusive behavior appears to depend on the overall number of periods of play; this relationship is negative in one case (δ = 0.60-P1) and positive in the other two (δ = 0.75-P2 and δ = 0.90-P2). When the trend is allowed to vary by treatment (spec. 2), it can be seen that there are substantial differences across treatments as to how collusion evolves. Although collusion decays in all treatments in the δ = 0.60-P1 pair, the fastest decay occurs in the GP treatment and the slowest in the RS treatment. Results in specification 2 for the three remaining δ-parameterization pairs indicate that collusion (i) increases with time in all cases in the FI treatment, (ii) increases with time in one case in the M treatment (δ = 0.75-P2), and (iii) decreases with time in one case in the IM treatment (δ = 0.75-P1). Specification 3 confirms the uneven evolution of collusion across treatments.
Using the estimates from the most flexible specification (spec. 3), we quantified the difference in the predicted probability of collusion between treatments (FI-M, M-IM, and FI-IM) at three different stages of the experiment: start (1st period), middle (61st period) and end (120th period). Figure 5 displays the results. The figure indicates (with dark gray markers) whether the differences are statistically different from zero at the 10% level (or less). The figure shows a general tendency for the computed differences to increase as one moves from less to more collusive-friendly δ-P pairs; this is particularly true for the FI-M comparison (i.e., the demand information effect). Also, the largest differences in the graph occur in period 120 (δ = 0.75-P1 and δ = 0.90-P2) 27 ; in these cases, learning seems to be important, but it appears to be present only in the FI treatment. Finally, the joint effect of monitoring and demand information is statistically significant in the three most collusive-friendly environments; however, this difference does not emerge until later in the experiment. 24 Alternatively, one can be agnostic about the precise nature of dependence of observations and allow the variancecovariance matrix of estimates to accommodate for correlation across error terms. Probit and OLS regressions of this type yield similar results (see Appendix G). 25 We opt to report estimated coefficients rather than their marginal effects because interpretation of marginal effects in the presence of interactions (specifications 2 and 3) is not straightforward. After the discussion of Table 6 , we describe a way of looking at the marginal effects of monitoring and demand information on collusion in the presence of interactions. 26 Because the remaining variables are 0/1 indicators (First, Rival Colluded, and ψ), their averages are fractions between zero and one. The results of Figure 6 are similar if, instead, the calculation sets these variables at zero (or one). 27 These differences are also the most statistically significant.
C RAND 2012. Note: Dependent variable is equal to 1 if subject chose "Low Output" (i.e., collude) in period t, and zero otherwise. FI, and IM are dichotomous variables that are equal to 1 if the observation corresponds to either of the two treatments, and zero otherwise (i.e., the left-out treatment is M). Period indicates the period number in the session (1-120). Rival Colluded Previous Period is equal to 1 if the other seller colluded in the previous period and zero otherwise. First Round is a dichotomous variable indicating the first round in each supergame.
TABLE 6 Random Effects Probit Estimates of the Effect of Information and Monitoring on
ψ is equal to 1 if subject colluded in the first period of the experiment and zero otherwise.
. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficient significant at * * * 1%, * * 5%, and * 10%.
C RAND 2012.
FIGURE 5 DIFFERENCES IN THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF COLLUSION BETWEEN TREATMENTS AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF THE EXPERIMENT
Note: The estimates in the figure correspond to the difference in probability P(T 1, period|x;θ) − P(T 2, period|x;θ ), where T1 and T2 correspond to the treatments being compared, period denotes the period of interest (1, 61, or 120),x denotes the average value of the remaining variables (except the two other treatment dummies, which are held at zero), andθ denotes the estimated parameters.
26 Standard errors are calculated using the delta method; a dark gray marker indicates that the corresponding p value is smaller than 0.1. Appendix G displays this figure for alternative specifications.
Overall, the results in Figure 5 suggest that monitoring may play a more important role as a determinant of collusion; however, the magnitude and existence of this effect appear to depend both on the specifics of the market environment as well as on experience. In terms of magnitude, the effect of demand information on collusion ranges from being statistically insignificant (δ = 0.60-P1) to increasing the probability of collusion by 0.33 (δ = 0.90-P2), whereas the effect of monitoring ranges from being statistically insignificant (δ = 0.60-P1 and δ = 0.90-P2) to increasing the probability of collusion by 0.15 (δ = 0.75-P2).
One last point worth noting is that reciprocating behavior appear to be a strong predictor of collusive behavior: the coefficient on "Rival Colluded Previous Period" has a large magnitude and is always statistically significant. Using the results in specification 3 to compute the corresponding marginal effect reveals that this variable increases the probability of collusion between 0.199 and 0.328 (depending on the δ-P pair).
Theory-related results. In this section, we report probit results for each session. As stated earlier, RS and GP predictions can be linked to demand realizations in different ways. Thus, we choose a specification that tests the effect of future and prior demand states on collusion. Specifically, our probit regression includes the indicator variables Next High and Next Medium (equal to 1 if next period's demand realization is high or medium, respectively) and Last Low and Last Medium (equal to 1 if the previous period's demand realization was low or medium, respectively).
If the collusive pattern predicted by RS is present in our data, we would expect collusion to be the lowest when demand is anticipated to be high (coefficient on Next High should be negative). Moreover, collusion should return to higher levels after a high demand period (i.e., Last Medium or Last Low should be negative, or at least nonpositive). Conversely, a prediction of the GP model is that collusion should decline after a negative demand shock (coefficient on Last Low should be negative) but should be unaffected by next period's demand realization (coefficients on Next High or Next Medium should be unimportant). The variables we just discussed do not capture C RAND 2012. Note: Dependent variable is equal to 1 if subject chose "Low Output" (i.e., collude) in period t, and zero otherwise. Next High is equal to 1 if next period's demand is high, and zero otherwise.
TABLE 7 Marginal Effects from Random Effects Probit
Next Medium is equal to 1 if next period's demand is medium, and zero otherwise. Last Low is equal to 1 if the previous period's demand was low, and zero otherwise. Last Medium is equal to 1 if the previous period's demand was medium, and zero otherwise. First is a dichotomous variable indicating the first round in each supergame. Period indicates the period number in the session (1-120). Rival Colluded Previous Period is equal to 1 if the other seller colluded in the previous period and zero otherwise.
ψ is equal to 1 if subject colluded in the first period of the experiment and zero otherwise. All specifications include a constant (not reported all features of the theoretical predictions, for example, the existence of price wars in the GP treatment. We discuss additional evidence that addresses this issue in Web Appendix H. Table 7 reports the estimated marginal effects of our probit specification for each treatment in every δ-P pair. The M treatment is included only for comparison purposes. Appendix G contains results of alternative specifications. Results on explanatory variables from the fifth regressor onward are consistent with those obtained in Table 6 . Among these variables, the other seller's behavior appears to be the main determinant of collusive behavior; its magnitude ranges from 0.109 to 0.525 and it is always statistically significant. Figure 6 helps visualize the importance of variables of theoretical interest (regressors 1-4) by graphically contrasting their marginal effects in the FI and M treatments. 28 It can be seen that a high demand state in the FI treatment plays a key role: the probability of collusion is lower before its occurrence (between −0.181 and −0.529 with respect to medium demand and between −0.521 and −0.693 with respect to low demand) but higher afterward (between 0.086 and 0.141 with respect to medium demand and between 0.174 and 0.205 with respect to low demand). 29 In other words, collusion significantly breaks down in anticipation of a high demand period, but this does not seem to interfere with subjects' ability to later maintain high collusion levels in medium and low demand states. This countercyclical pattern appears to also hold between medium and low demand periods, although it becomes less important as one moves to more collusive-friendly δ-P pairs.
Conversely, the most important determinant of collusion in the IM treatment (among the four regressors in the figure) is past demand: collusion is lower after a low demand period (between −0.064 and −0.185 with respect to high demand and between −0.008 and −0.051 with respect to medium) although this difference is only statistically significant with respect to a high demand realization.
Although we interpret the results above as consistent with the predictions of both the RS and GP theories, we believe that subjects' ability to tacitly collude in the way predicted by RS is the most salient feature in our experiments. This level of complexity in collusive strategies can be seen in subjects' responses to the open-ended question mentioned earlier, which are shown in Web Appendix H.
Concluding remarks
In this article, we focus on two factors that have been prominent in the theory of infinitely repeated games with stochastic demand: monitoring and demand information. Guided by theory, we construct experiments to study the effect of these two factors on collusion. In addition, we explore the extent to which theoretical predictions from two prominent models find support in our data.
The results of our investigation can be grouped into two findings. First, demand information might facilitate collusion more than monitoring. We believe that this result needs further investigation, as results appear to depend both on the parameterization of the experiment as well as on subjects' experience. For example, our experimental design has the feature that there is a large difference between payoffs across demand states, which may make demand information relatively more important than monitoring in this setting. On the other hand, as payoffs in demand states approach one another, monitoring becomes unnecessary. A hypothesis worth exploring is whether and how demand information continues to be as important as the distribution of demand states is tighter.
Our second result is that we find strong support for the countercyclical collusive pattern predicted by the RS theory. The large and statistically significant results across all variants of our experiment as well as across all descriptive and econometric tests allow us to attach more confidence to this finding. This result is interesting for two reasons. First, a large portion of subjects are able to achieve collusion in a stochastic market environment even in the absence of communication. Second, this type of collusion is fairly sophisticated as behavior follows a state-dependent strategy.
In general, we interpret the empirical evidence as highlighting the importance of uncertainty on collusion: collusion is highest in the most certain environment (RS) and lowest in the least certain one (GP). The certainty granted by the precise anticipation of next period's demand is particularly important. One can interpret this feature of the RS environment as an effective mechanism through which firms can coordinate on a collusive equilibrium. More specifically, one can imagine that the RS theory has an advantage over other theories in that tomorrow's demand state can act as a public correlation device.
The RS and GP theories are used to motivate our research and to design our experiments. Thus, this article should not be viewed as a test of one theory versus another, nor should we interpret the weaker evidence for GP-type predictions as absolute absence of empirical support for this influential model. It is possible that the predictions of the GP model are valid in other market environments or experimental designs beyond the scope of this article. Although our results are informative as to how complex tacit collusion can be in practice, we see a pressing need for more research looking at this issue. Never Never Never Never one makes the right-hand side as small as possible, thus making the following condition a sufficient one for (L,H) to be an equilibrium:
In our case, it suffices to check whether, for each demand state, the above condition holds when we set x = C . If it does, then, by symmetry, the equilibrium (H,L) is also feasible; it is important to note, again, that these equilibria are state dependent. In our design, the (H,L) equilibrium is feasible under the grim-trigger strategy for almost all values of the CRRA parameter (see Table A1 ).
The imperfect monitoring treatment (GP theory).
As with the FI treatment, it is easy to show that playing the one-shot NE (H,H) in every period is an equilibrium of this game. As opposed to the FI treatment, the collusive equilibria that we consider here refer to the "collusive path" proposed by GP: reversion to the one-shot NE occurs for some period of time (finite or infinite).
iii In this type of equilibrium, two variables need to be calibrated: the punishment length (N) and the threshold level (price). As shown by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) , the set of equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by considering a grim-trigger strategy (or less severe punishments) and then finding the smallest public signal for which collusion is incentive compatible. Using Abreu et al.'s insight, it is straightforward to compute the feasible set of "collusive" equilibria and the corresponding range of incentive-compatible punishment lengths. We proceed as follows. For each of the five possible threshold levels (i.e., each of the five prices implied by our prisoner's dilemma structure; see Appendix B), we compute the range of the CRRA coefficients for which the N = 1 and N = ∞ GP outcomes (the two extreme GP equilibria) satisfy condition (4). Table A2 presents the results of this calculation. Note that except for the two extreme threshold levels (p 0 and p 4 ), the GP equilibria are feasible. The CRRA feasibility range grows as one moves to more collusive-friendly δ-P pairs as well as with punishment length. The analysis in the article (Table 3 and Section 6) considers p 2 as it accommodates the GP equilibrium for the broadest set of risk preferences (including, in all but one case, risk aversion, r = 0). 
Appendix E
Decision and profit screens for the three treatments (parameterization 1) Table 6 OLS RESULTS, CLUSTERED STANDARD ERRORS, ALL SUPERGAMES Robustness Check for Figure 6 
